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Abstract. A collaborative planning effort between partners that form
coalitions may be complicated by policies that regulate what actions
they may deploy in their plans and, in particular, what information they
are allowed to exchange during the planning process. We are interested
in situations where coalitions have to be formed ad-hoc without much
co-training. For this, we investigate how agents can support human plan-
ners in producing good plans while observing the normative standards
that regulate their planning and communication behavior. Based on an
implementation of such norm-processing agents, we conducted a set of
experiments, where human test subjects were conducting collaborative
planning tasks under the guidance of these agents. A summary of exper-
imental results is provided in the paper.
1 Introduction
Constructing joint plans within coalitions in time-stressed situations poses a par-
ticular challenge, especially in the face of individual goals, self interest and with
coalition members having only limited co-training for recognizing and resolving
their differences. During planning, coalition partners may also have to take into
account specific policies that describe what their obligations, permissions and
prohibitions are in terms of the actions comprising a plan and the communication
necessary to coordinate planning activities with coalition partners. With such
policies in place, human planners are under pressure to produce high-quality
plans, while adhering to all their obligations and prohibitions as described by
their policies. In this paper, we describe how agents can assist human planners
in a monitoring and advisory capacity in their policy-driven (norm-driven) plan-
ning efforts. The scope of this work is to investigate how policies (or norms)
influence collaborative planning and whether agents can ease the cognitive bur-
den for human planners to create high-quality shared plans in the face of such
policies.
In the following, we describe the development of agents that observe both
communication and planning activities and provide feedback on how these ac-
tions might impact on a human planner’s normative situation. We conducted a
set of experiments to investigate the effectiveness and impact of such agents in
a collaborative planning scenario and provide insights about the results of these
experiments.
2 Agents monitoring Policies
We consider the use of agents to monitor communication and planning activities
of coalition partners and reason about possible policy violations. As the human
planners are involved in a distributed planning problem, they may not be aware
of potential differences and conflicts between the different policies held by the
coalition partners. This may adversely impact on the planning process due to
the time and effort it may take to identify and reconcile policy conflicts. Also,
situations may occur that call for certain policies to be violated in order to
produce a viable plan. We base our notion of policies on normative concepts, in
particular, these are:
– the obligations that must be fulfilled,
– the prohibitions that constrain/forbid particular actions, and
– the permissions that define the range of actions that are allowed.
We regard policies to be relevant (or active) during a planning activity under
specific conditions only. Due to this conditional nature, a human planner may
not recognize that policies are in conflict with those of coalition members, that
violations occurred or that policies are relevant to the present circumstances.
Based on what planning actions are taken or what is communicated, this nor-
mative position may change – for example, an obligation may become fulfilled
or a specific planned action violates a prohibition. These changes have to be ob-
served and remembered by the human planner (which is a cognitively demanding
task) and make collaborative planning under such norms/policies a complicated
task. Agents can provide assistance to a human planner by detecting and ad-
vising a planner when policies become active, when policy violations occur and
may also propose courses of actions that may resolve such conflicts.
Agents, as we utilize them, do not form coalitions themselves or are part
of a virtual organization. These agents operate in a supportive role to a human
planner in order to ease the cognitive burden on human planners during a collab-
orative planning effort. The agent is assigned solely to a specific human planner
and operates in a monitoring, controlling and/or advicing capacity. In order for
the agent to work effectively in tandem with the human planner, the agent must
intercept any communication and planning action before it is actually performed
in order to provide the human planner with warnings in case violations were to
occur and possibly advise how to rectify such a situation. The agent, therefore,
has to maintain a representation of the normative position of the human planner,
which is a potential one (and not the actual situation). Based on this “outlook”
at a potential future normative situation, the agent can reason about appropriate
responses to that.
In the experiments performed, we were interested in how an agent can support
a collaborative planning activity. In particular, we investigated two supporting
strategies or “aiding conditions” for an agent:
– in the critique condition, the agent detects policy violations that are incurred
by the human planners in their communication and planning behavior. In
case of a violation, the agent either (a) intercepts the sending of a message or
(b) interrupts the planning of actions in order to inform the human planner
about the set of policies that become activated due to these intended and
violating actions – the planner can then decide whether to adhere to such
an advice or to ignore the agent and intentionally violate a policy;
– in the censor condition, the agent still monitors the activities of the human
planner, but silently interferes with the communication by deleting offending
parts of the exchanged messages (or blocking them completely) in order to
avert policy violations; in that case, the receiver is informed that a message
is either truncated or completely censored.
The difference between the two types of agents is in their policy-related feed-
back to the human planner and their subsequent interaction. The critic agent,
besides reasoning about policies, also monitors plan steps committed by a human
planner and reasons about the effect of policies on planned actions. The censor
agent, on the other hand, is not concerned with effects of policies on planned
actions int only interecpts and forbids the transmission of messages that con-
tain policy violations. The critique agent does not force the user to a particular
action, it merely provides advice and suggestions, which the user can accept or
reject. Both conditions are compared to a third control condition (the unaided
condition), where the test subjects did not have any agent support.
2.1 Modelling Policies
Policies are given to the human planner in a verbalized form. The following
example is taken from our example domain outlined in subsequent sections:
Example 1. “IF you want to deploy an ambulance along route R on day D for a
rescue operation, THEN you are obliged to obtain a commitment of escort from
your coalition partner”
This policy will become relevant to the human planner in the course of plan-
ning such a rescue operation, if the deployment of this specific resouce is in-
tended. In becoming relevant, it adds to the current “social burden” of the hu-
man planner – it has to observe this obligation (beside possible other activated
norms) and see to it that it is fulfilled. This obligation will be fulfilled when such
a commitment of escort is obtained. In that case, we regard the obligation to
have expired. We, therefore need to specify these additional fulfillment or expi-
ration conditions. The example above would then be complete by ammending it
with the following information:
Example 2. “IF you want to deploy an ambulance along route R on day D for a
rescue operation, THEN you are obliged to obtain a commitment of escort from
your coalition partner. IF you have aquired a commitment of escort along route
R before day D THEN this obligation is fulfilled”
Independent of whether an obligation is fulfilled, it will also be de-activated
in case that the activating circumstances no longer hold. In case of the above
example, if the human planner decides to discard the planned deployment of an
ambulance, this obligation is no longer relevant.
The following example shows a prohibition:
Example 3. “IF you know that the route R on day D is dangerous for deploy-
ments, THEN you are prohibited to deploy an ambulance along route R on day
D for a rescue operation”
This prohibition becomes relevant if there is knowledge about danger on the
given route available. As is obvious, this can also be formulated as a permis-
sion: “If there is no knowledge of danger ... THEN you are permitted ...”. It
shows that, in the design of policies, we have to clarify the default normative
position for a coalition partner: the point of view from which the policies are
designed – are we assuming that “everything is permitted that is not explic-
itly prohibited” or do we take the stance that “everything is prohibited that is
not explicitly permitted”? For the design of our policies, we decided that, per
default, any plan and communication action is permitted and that we provide
explicit prohibitions only in cases where this does not obtain (explicit permis-
sions may be included to specify particular exceptions to a given prohibition,
e.g. “You are ONLY permitted, IF ...”). In the same way as obligations, prohibi-
tions must be augmented with conditions that indicate the circumstances under
which a violation occurs. Due to the specific way the agent processes norms (as
described later), prohibitions have an activation condition that describes the (set
of) violating circumstances – with an activation of a prohibition, its violation is
indicated, whereas in its deactivated state, it is regarded as not violated.
In accordance with definitions used in previous work [1], we describe here the
normative position of the human planner, which is monitored by the agent (and,
therefore, is also the normative position of the agent), as the set Ω of currently
activated policies:
Definition 1. The set Ω comprises the currently instantiated policies, contain-
ing the permissions given, the obligations that must be fulfilled, and the prohibi-
tions that are potentially under threat of violation.
Note, that the agent intercepts the actions of the monitored human planner,
before these actions actually take place. This allows the agent to assess the
normative consequences of an action, before harm is done and can inform the
human planner accordingly. If Ω contains activated prohibitions then the agent
signals potential violations and not actual ones. By providing information about
those violations and active obligations to the human planners, the monitoring
agent may be able to motivate them to correct their behavior.
With respect to an implementation of such an agent, with each occurrence of
either a communication or planning action, we regard the set Ω being discarded,
the activations of all policies checked afresh and a new set Ω′ created. Ω′ repre-
sents the potential normative position of the human planner that would obtain,
if the intercepted actions take place. If the coalition finishes its collaborative
planning activity, the set Ωfinal, maintained for an individual coalition partner
by its monitoring agent, can have the following states:
(a) Ωfinal is empty or contains only permissions – the human planner has a
clean record with all obligations fulfilled and no prohibitions violated, or
(b) Ωfinal still contains obligations and/or prohibitions – this indicates, that
those obligations were not fulfilled and the violation of prohibitions persisted
beyond the planning session.
At that point in time, Ωfinal, represents the actual normative state of the
human planner.
Our representation of policies follows our earler work [2]. We specify an obli-
gation, permission or prohibition on a particular action with two condition –
an activation and an expiration/fulfillment condition – determining whether a
policy is relevant to the human planner. If we define the set Expr as the set
of all possible well-formed formulae comprising first-order predicates over terms
(constants, variables and the operators ∧, ∨ and ¬, then a policy can be defined
in the following way:
Definition 2. A policy, expressing an obligation, permission, prohibition is a
tuple 〈ν, ρ, ϕ, a, e〉, where
– ν ∈ {O,P,F} is a label indicating whether this is an obligation, permission
or prohibition
– ρ is a role identifier for a norm addressee
– ϕ describes the action regulated by this policy
– a ∈ Expr is the activation condition
– e ∈ Expr is the expiration condition
This definition displays in a simple fashion the elements that characterize
an implementation of our policies – they are ascribed to a specific role (in our
experiments, we have the roles “Party A” as the humanitarian organization and
“Party B” as the military organization) and are activated/de-activated under
certain conditions. The policies themselves exist in two forms, (a) formulated
in simple “IF ... THEN ...”-statements that are given to human planners, and
(b) implemented as a set of rules, expressing their activation/de-activation, in
order to allow agents a processing of these policies and the reasoning about their
current activation state.
3 Planning and Communication Environment
For agents to become operational, they must have access to plans in development
and communication activities. We use a traditional forward-chaining mechanism
(expert system shell Jess [3]) to implement the policy reasoning mechanism for
an agent. According to our model, a policy will experience activations and de-
activations under specific circumstances. In order to correctly implement their
activation and de-activation, each policy is expressed by a set of rules and data-
structures recording such an activation state.
As we noted before, the agent operates in a fixed monitoring cycle:
(a) detect the current situation changed by arriving messages expressing the
coalition partners’ commitments for action or revealed intelligence, as well
as new planned actions,
(b) reason about these changes, and
(c) create the new set of activated policies.
The agent has to intercept both communication and planning actions in order
to update an internal representation of the normative situation at hand.
3.1 Conversations during Planning
In terms of communication between human planners, we strongly simplified and
restricted the way conversations within a coalition takes place. In order for agents
to easily monitor communication and reason about the messages exchanged,
human planners converse in writing, using a specific set of message types.
In this conversation, a planning party may request another coalition member
to commit to a specific action or to provide particular information. The planning
party itself may also be the target of such a request. On the other hand, planning
parties may pro-actively offer information or commit to specific actions as they
develop their own plan. Finally, a planner may have to change its plan and,
therefore, withdraw commitments or withdraw requests or offers. By identifying
these general types of conversations, we can establish a set of message types:
Performative Type
REQUEST commitment, information
OFFER commitment
INFORM information
ACCEPT commitment
PROVIDE commitment, information
DENY commitment, information
WITHDRAW commitment, request for information
Table 1. Message Types
Messages according to these types are used in conversations that follow par-
ticular transitions as shown in figure 1. Dialogs for requesting a commitment
or pro-actively offering it are shown. A REQUEST (for commitment) has to
be answered with either a PROVIDE (a commitment) or a DENY. In the pro-
active case, an OFFER can be answered with either an ACCEPT or a DENY.
Requests, commitments, offers and the acceptance of offers can be withdrawn in
a separate WITHDRAW conversation. The state transistions in figure 1 show
annotations such as A:RCx etc. These indicate that, for example, party A sends
a REQUEST for a commitment (the x is a placeholder for particular domain-
specific information).
S Wait for B’s Reply
Committed
Uncommitted
A:RCx
B:PCx
B:DCx
A:WCx
A,B:WCx
Request-Initial Commitments
S Wait for A’s Reply
Committed
Uncommitted
B:OCx
A:ACx
A:DCx
B:WCx
A,B:WCx
Offer-Initial Commitments
Legend:
A = Requester
B = Provider
Fig. 1. Request and Offer Conversations
Not shown is INFORM, as it is a special case. It allows to disclose particular
information proactively such as the set of plan steps in the planner’s own plan
or confidential information, without requests from another party or expecting a
reply.
For planning, a human planner is provided with a set of domain-specific
actions and basic manipulation operations to assemble a plan.
4 Scenario
We chose rescue missions as an example scenario and performed a set of ex-
periments to investigate the effectiveness of agents supporting a collaborative
planning effort in the context of this scenario.
In this scenario, we assume that there are two parties that form a coalition,
a humanitarian relief organization with the individual goal of rescuing injured
civilians from a potentially hostile region, and a military organization that has
to coordinate its military objectives with the evacuation activities. In the exper-
imental setup, the humanitarian organization is regarded as “Party A” and the
military organisation as “Party B”. The goal of this coalition is to find a joint
plan for rescuing as many injured people from a dangerous region to a hospital
in the shortest possible time. The optimal situation for Party A would be to
provide medical attention and evacuation as soon as possible. For this, party
A may need support from party B, for example, an escort through a dangerous
region. Party B, on the other hand, has military objectives that, potentially, may
be in conflict with the support given to party A.
We assume that both parties have a set of resources such as ambulances, field
hospitals/paramedic units, rescue helicopters, Jeeps, etc.. During their planning
activity, the coalition partners will allocate these resources to be used in planned
actions. We assume that party A and party B have a small set of capabilities
they may plan to utilize in pursuing a mission. Party A can either evacuate
wounded people, taking round-trips to their location or dispatch a paramedic
unit to provide medical care at their location directly. Party B may either support
party A by providing escort through dangerous terrain or pursue its own military
goals by attacking enemy strongholds.
In support of the communication necessary during planning, a set of domain-
specific speech acts is provided according to the types of performatives outlined
above. Previously, we determined that there is a need for the performatives RE-
QUEST, OFFER, INFORM, PROVIDE, ACCEPT, DENY and WITHDRAW
to enable regimented conversations between human planners. We also saw that
these conversations are subject to the exchange of either commitments or spe-
cific information necessary to the decision process of whether a specific action
should be planned or not. The kind of commitments or information exchanged
with these messages is domain-specific. In our case, we assume that party A and
B exchange the following commitments:
– guarantee safety of a road (B to A)
– provide escort (B to A)
– evacuate (A to B)
– dispatch (A to B)
For example, party A can issue a REQUEST to party B asking for an es-
cort. Party B would then either provide this commitment or deny the request.
Information about the following aspects may be exchanged as well:
– intelligence
– intelligence source
– plan step
– specifics (request/provide more details regarding what road/resource/day)
With that, the parties are enabled to disclose intelligence or the source of
intelligence, or to communicate planned activities and whether a road is safe for
evacuating wounded etc.
Fig. 2. Experiment Interface
5 Experiments
The human planner interacts with the agent via the application as depicted in
figure 2 – the interface is shown in a mode where agents operate in the “critique”
condition. The purpose of this interface is to provide the user with the possibility
of sending messages to coalition partners, maintain a plan and interact with an
agent. If the agent operates in the “critique” condition, it will report back on
the results of its monitoring the communication and planning activities of the
human planner. The following information is provided to the user in the top
section of this interface (characterizing a potential normative situation):
– reminders about the current set of active obligations (right upper window)
– the set of potential violations of prohibitions (left upper window) – the user
can either ignore this warning (intentional violation of a norm) or accept it
If the user accepts the warning of a policy violation, the offending action –
sending a message or adding a particular plan step will be aborted. If the user
ignores the warning these actions would go ahead.
In addition, the user manages its communication by assembling messages via
pull-down menus (left part of the interface) or uses a chat window to directly
converse with a coalition partner (which is not monitored by the agent), as well
as its plan in the right part of the interface.
5.1 Experimental Task
The experiments conducted are characterized by the interaction of two human
test subjects acting as planners in the role of the humanitarian organization
(Party A) and the military organization (Party B). Both test subjects are pro-
vided with details about their private goals, resources, intelligence, their capabil-
ities, and policies. Both parties are given different maps that outline locations or
destinations, from where – in the case of Party A – injured people must be evac-
uated, or that represent insurgent strongholds that must be defeated by Party B.
These destinations have numerical requirements – in case of Party A, a specific
number of wounded to be evacuated, in case of Party B, insurgent strongholds
have a specific resistance value that must be overcome by military means and
incur costs.
Thirty teams, each comprising two paid subjects, were recruited to partici-
pate in the study. These teams were tested in their collaborative planning effort
in one of three conditions, the unaided condition (control), the condition where
the agent acted as a “critic”, and the condition where the agent acted as a “cen-
sor”, resulting in ten teams operating in each of the three conditions. The test
subjects were forbidden to share computer screens, note sheets or other such aids
and worked isolated from each other. They could only describe their intentions,
commitments and planned resource deployments by using either a structured
representation of messages or a free-form text chat box of the experiment soft-
ware environment. The test subjects were given written documents as well as
shown a video briefing them about the impending task explaining the mission ob-
jectives, resources, policies, resource deployment costs and planning constraints
(e.g. a jeep can take only 5 wounded in each deployment). In a first step, a team
performed a practice problem as a warmup in order to become familiar with
the planning process. In particular, the practice problem of party A was: “Plan
the lowest cost emergency medical evacuation to the village of Tersa on Day 1.
Be sure to do so in a way that is compatible with your policies. What is the
total cost of your operation?” As the second step, the team then performed the
complete planning problem in one of the described experimental conditions. The
total allotted time to finish the whole experiment including reading the briefing,
video viewing and performing the practice problem, was 2 hours.
6 Results
The results of these experiments have shown that agents can have a positive
impact on the enforcement of policies. We saw that in the unaided experiment
condition (no agent monitoring and feedback), individuals would make on av-
erage from 7 − 10 policy violations, with all individuals making at least three
policy violations, per session. With reference to Figure 3, we saw that the rate
of individuals deliberately violating policies dropped to a median average of one
violation per session, with many individuals not making any policy violations at
all.
Fig. 3. Willful User Override of Agent Enforcement
This article reports experiments with two types of aiding strategies: a critic
and a censor. Neither form of assistance prompted the human subjects to at-
tempt more or fewer policy violations, as evidenced by the lack of statistical
significance in differences shown in Figure 4. There was a minority of human
subjects, however, that adjusted the ways in which they used the agents as a re-
sult of the type of agent intervention. For example, in the censor condition, some
users would try to exhaustively generate-and-test communications for granting
clearances or committing to escorts against the censorship of the agent.
Fig. 4. All User-Committed Policy Violations
The following characteristics were observed about the critic condition.
– 60% of the subjects in both Parties A and B felt that it was necessary to
override the critic agent in order to complete their plans (Figure 3).
– only one subject out of thirty actually reached the mission objective of treat-
ing 100% of the wounded on the first day of the mission. The subject did
so without violating any policies, but with the assistance of 13 interventions
from the critic agent.
– there is a slight degradation of performance between subjects in the control
and in the critic conditions. We hypothesize that this behavior is due to the
critic agent focusing the user’s attention on avoiding policy violations rather
than on the objectives of their task.
– the mean plan cost is slightly higher in the critic condition than in the control
condition. When considering, however, that 4 out of 10 subjects in the critic
condition did not violate any mission-impacting policies, it is possible that
Party A’s plan costs are better approximations of the true plan costs.
The following characteristics were observed about the censor condition.
– Of the two agents, critic and censor, the censor agent was the most effec-
tive at preventing policy violations. Only 3 out of 20 individuals actually
circumvented the censorship of the censor agent, each one committing only
1 violation.
– The censor agent was unable to provide feedback on mission impacting policy
violations (MIPVs) that were introduced as plan steps, so its performance
in reducing MIPVs cannot be distinguished from the control condition.
– The Party A subjects in the censor condition were most distracted from
their mission objective of treating as many wounded as possible on day 1.
We hypothesize that the lack of direct feedback to the user committing the
violation may be the cause.
– Similarly for both parties, the plan costs were greatest in the censor condi-
tion. We hypothesize that the lack of direct feedback to the user committing
the violations may cause confusion, distracting the user from being mindful
of their plan costs.
Results from these experiments provide us with feedback that informs the de-
sign of future policy-enforcing agents. For example, the censor agent was clearly
the undisputed best enforcer of policy. Its enforcement reliability was countered
by a significant increase of plan costs and distraction from the mission objec-
tives for Party A. The critic agent immediately flagged policy violations, so it
was possible for at least one subject in all three conditions to achieve the perfect
plan (e.g. treating all the wounded on day 1), as well as enabling others to have
zero mission impacting policy violations. A possible next agent to test would
be a critiquing censor agent that: is capable of critiquing plan steps, provides
direct feedback to the user that it is censoring, and does so without allowing the
censored subject to override it.
7 Related Work
Policies have been used in disparate fields, ranging from security models of pro-
gramming languages to the management of resources in distributed IT systems
[4]. In this context, policies are usually regarded as “permissions” that allow
the performance of specific actions such as access to data or the use of network
resources. This view has its limitations: it is assumed that what is not explicitly
permitted is prohibited and the concept of an obligation is not present tradi-
tionally. Recent work [5, 6] introduces richer concepts for describing policies (e.g.
“obligation policies”).
Our concept of a policy is strongly alligned with research into normative sys-
tems, in particular work on norm-governed agency, virtual organizations [7–10]
and Electronic Institutions [11–14]. In this paper, we expand on work presented
in [15] and describe a specific application of normative agents, where agents
do not form virtual organisations, but observe the behaviour of human planners
within a coalition. In this setting, the agent is focussed on understanding current
knowledge held by the human planners – what intelligence they hold about the
current state of the world, what commitments they received and made, as well
as what requests they expressed and what their current plan is. With such mon-
itoring agents in place, we share similar concerns as those posed in the context
of Electronic Institutions, as outlined, for example, in [13, 14]. In a very simi-
lar fashion, we must monitor the communication behavior of coalition partners,
assess the eligibility of the messages exchanged and reason about the current
normative state. By using a rule-based language for encoding policies and, con-
sequently, a rule engine such as the Jess Expert System Shell for processing these
specifications, we followed a very similar implementation path as described in
[13, 12], in particular implementing the reasoning about norms in Jess [16].
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed difficulties in establishing joint plans within coalitions
in the face of self interest, individual goals and diverse policies of the coalition
members. For a planner, it would be easiest to operate without any restrictions,
constraints or regulations on the operations that may be added to a plan. In a
social context and, in particular, a diverse one such as coalitions of independent
partners, this is not possible. As we showed, detailed and, sometimes, even con-
flicting policies have to be dealt with in practice, when coalitions try to engage
in collaborative planning. With such policies and restrictions in place, planning
becomes more complicated and optimal plans may be hard to achieve. We there-
fore advocate agent support for policy-based planning activities within coalitions.
In this paper, we demonstrated how agents can be integrated into the dialogi-
cal process of human planners establishing a collaborative plan. We described
two agent-based strategies for assisting the collaborative planning process: (a)
a “critic” that provides active feedback about the fulfillment of policies and (b)
a “censor” agent that silently manipulates the interaction between human plan-
ners so that their interaction and information exchanged takes place according
to given policies. We have outlined an experimental framework that allows us to
evaluate the effects of these strategies in the context of a military-humanitarian
scenario and presented data that shows the impact of agent support on the
planning results.
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